Earthquake Risk and Engineering towards a Resilient World

9 - 10 July 2015, Homerton College, Cambridge, UK


SECED 2015 was a two-day conference on Earthquake and Civil Engineering Dynamics that took place on 9-10th July 2015 at Homerton College, Cambridge.

This was the first major conference to be held in the UK on this topic since SECED hosted the 2002 European Conference on Earthquake Engineering in London.

The conference brought together experts from a broad range of disciplines, including structural engineering, nuclear engineering, seismology, geology, geotechnical engineering, urban development, social sciences, business and insurance; all focused on risk, mitigation and recovery.

Conference themes

  • Geotechnical earthquake engineering
  • Seismic design for nuclear facilities
  • Seismic hazard and engineering seismology
  • Masonry structures
  • Risk and catastrophe modelling
  • Vibrations, blast and civil engineering dynamics
  • Dams and hydropower
  • Seismic assessment and retrofit of engineered and non-engineered structures
  • Social impacts and community recovery

Keynote speakers

SECED 2015 featured the following keynote speakers (affiliations correct at the time of the conference):

  • Peter Ford and Tim Allmark, Office for Nuclear Regulation, UK
  • Don Anderson, CH2M HILL, Seattle, USA
  • Bernard Dost, Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, The Netherlands
  • Anne Kiremidjian, Stanford University, USA
  • Rob May, Golder Associates, Australia
  • Tiziana Rossetto, University College London, UK
  • Andrew Whittaker, University at Buffalo, USA
  • Mike Willford, Arup, The Netherlands

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This paper provides a very simplified analysis of the risk arising from earthquake hazard on nuclear plant. The analysis captures the effect of the hazard being defined as an exceedance probability, rather than a point probability, per unit time. It also investigates the common cause nature of the hazard to multiple lines of protection and illustrates the dramatic effect this feature can exert on plant risk. One of the principal findings from the analysis is that the potential for plant failure due to earthquake hazard is most likely between the design basis value and twice this value, if the design basis represents a 1% conditional probability of plant failure. This highlights the importance of analysing the beyond design basis response of nuclear plant.

This analysis is presented as part of a discussion of the changes made recently to the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s (ONR’s) Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs). These changes were prompted by lessons arising from the Fukushima event in March 2011 and include an extended discussion of beyond design basis response.

Tags: Reliability  
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